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INTRODUCTION
December 6, 2006, began just like any other ordinary day for Joe-
lis Jardines. However, by the end of the day, Mr. Jardines' life would be
changed forever. That day, based on an uncorroborated anonymous tip, a
police officer arrived at Mr. Jardines' home, stepped onto his property
with a dog named Franky, and approached Mr. Jardines' front porch.2
However, the officer was not alone. He was accompanied by multiple
law enforcement departments, narcotics detectives, DEA, and federal
agents.3 State and federal agencies were also on scene for surveillance
and backup.' Franky began sniffing around and tracked an odor coming
from inside the house at which point he alerted to the presence of illegal
narcotics.' Based on Franky's alert, the police obtained a warrant to
search Mr. Jardines' home, searched the entire house, and discovered
* Appellate attorney for the Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office; Adjunct Professor at St.
Thomas University School of Law; B.A. 2003, University of Florida; J.D. 2007 St. Thomas
University School of Law. I would like to sincerely thank Emily Horowitz for the opportunity to
write this article. I would also like to thank Howard K. Blumberg for all his guidance and
mentoring. Without him, the topic of this article would not have been written. Finally, I would like
to thank my amazing wife, Elaina, for her unconditional love and support and for making me the
luckiest person in the world.
1. The date initially cited in Jardines is December 6, 2006. However, page 46 of the case
gives the date of the sniff test as December 5, 2006. This is a scrivener's error.
2. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla. 2011).
3. Id. at 46.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 37.
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marijuana being grown.6 Mr. Jardines was arrested and charged with
trafficking in marijuana.7 The entire spectacle lasted hours, all in plain
view of the neighbors and the public.' Jardines moved to suppress the
evidence seized during the unlawful search.'
In reversing the trial court's granting of the motion to suppress, the
appellate court held that the use of a drug detector dog at a defendant's
front door does not constitute a search because the police conduct did
not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy, even though the set-
ting was a person's home."o The court relied on previous cases around
the country involving dog sniffs showing a person either had no expecta-
tion of privacy or that the expectation was severely diminished and did
not outweigh the minimal government intrusion."
The Florida Supreme Court, however, in reversing the court of
appeal, based its decision on the cornerstone of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence-the home is a person's castle and affords the highest
protection of privacy.12 Relying on Supreme Court precedent in Kyllo
v. United States,'3 the Florida Supreme Court held that "[g]iven the spe-
cial status accorded a citizen's home in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence . . . the warrantless 'sniff test' that was conducted at the front
door of the residence in the present case was an unreasonable govern-
ment intrusion into the sanctity of the home and violated the Fourth
Amendment."l 4 The State of Florida has recently appealed the Florida
Supreme Court's ruling to the United States Supreme Court, which has
issued certiorari and will hear the case later this year." Specifically, the
question the Court granted certiorari on is whether a dog sniff, at a per-
son's home, constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
thus requiring the government to possess probable cause before con-
6. Id. at 37-38.
7. Id. at 38, 48.
8. Id. at 48. ("The entire on-the-scene government activity-i.e., the preparation for the
'sniff test,' the test itself, and the aftermath, which culminated in the full-blown search of
Jardines' home-lasted for hours.").
9. Id. at 38.
10. State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1, 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
11. Id. at 5-6 ("[A] majority of federal circuit courts have viewed the Place Court's holding
as generally categorizing canine sniffs as non-searches.") (citing United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d
692 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Roby, 122 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235 (7th Cir. 1990)).
"Likewise, 'the vast majority of state courts considering canine sniffs have recognized that a
canine sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search."' Jardines, 9 So. 3d at 6 (quoting People v. Jones,
755 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008)).
12. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 45-46.
13. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
14. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 55-56.
15. Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
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ducting such a sniff.16
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."" To constitute a
search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the government must
intrude into a person's expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable.'I Generally, if the government conducts a search, absent exi-
gent circumstances, probable cause is required before conducting the
search." If a person does not have an expectation of privacy, then no
search occurs and probable cause is not required before the government
intrudes into a person's life.2 0
Ever since the "expectation of privacy" analysis started in Katz v.
United States and upheld a person's Fourth Amendment rights in a pub-
lic place when police were attempting to wire tap a phone booth without
a warrant to listen to a person's conversations,2 1 the United States
Supreme Court has been defining what constitutes a search on a case by
case basis. The Court has had to determine whether a search occurred
when the police looked into a person's garbage,2 2 used a pen registry at
a phone company to ascertain what numbers were dialed in a private
home,23 and used aerial surveillance of a private home's surrounding
area.24 The Court has constantly determined when and where a search
occurs and when and where a person has an expectation of privacy.
However, in situations where there is no physical intrusion but the
police use a dog to sniff the outside of certain objects or areas to deter-
mine the presence of contraband, the test to determine if a search has
occurred and whether a person has an expectation of privacy becomes
more difficult. While the United States Supreme Court held in United
States v. Place that a dog sniff does not constitute a search, it did so
analyzing the situation in a public setting, in an airport with a person's
luggage,25 and again in Illinois v. Caballes, in an automobile on a public
16. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (No. 11-564), 2011 WL
5254666.
17. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
18. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-29 (1987).
20. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1988).
21. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
22. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37.
23. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737-38 (1979).
24. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
25. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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roadway.2 6 However, the court has never addressed whether a dog sniff
constitutes a search when the setting is a person's private home.
Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun were correct in United
States v. Place, that it was a mistake to attempt to resolve the dog sniff
issue given the fact that the issue in Place was the narrower question of
whether a seizure occurred in an airport with a person's luggage, not
whether a search occurred from a dog sniff.2 7 Neither of the parties filed
briefs or researched the issue, and the Court was not in a position to
consider other circumstances that could occur regarding dog sniffs.2 8
The other circumstances that could occur arose in Mr. Jardines' home.
Now there is a knock on the Supreme Court's door asking it to address
whether a dog sniff constitutes a search when the setting is a person's
private home and what expectation of privacy a person has in fending
off unwarranted government intrusion. In today's post-9/11 society,
where it appears that many of our rights to privacy are vanishing by the
day, a person can only wonder, until the Court addresses the issue this
year, how far government intrusion can cross the line and whether the
home is still protected by the Fourth Amendment or if it is just an
Amendmyth.
While various jurisdictions have relied on the Court's holdings in
United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes to determine that a dog
sniff is not a search when the setting is a public or quasi-public place,
they also rely on the Court's holding in United States v. Jacobsen2 9 to
find that a person has no expectation of privacy in contraband. However,
in addition to Florida, Indiana is the only other jurisdiction that has
addressed dog sniffs at a person's house and found that such a sniff
constitutes a search.3 0 These two jurisdictions relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in Kyllo v. United States to uphold the sanctity and pri-
vacy of a person's home-regardless of what is inside.
So what happens when the dog sniffs in Place and Caballes meet
Kyllo's private home context? What expectation of privacy, if any, will
the Court determine people have in their homes in relation to dog sniffs?
This article will focus on, through courts' interpretations, the expecta-
tion of privacy a person has when a dog sniffs in a public versus a pri-
vate setting. Part one addresses the United States Supreme Court's
holdings in Place, Jacobsen and Caballes and subsequent interpretations
26. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
27. See Place, 462 U.S. at 710-11 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 720-21
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 723-24.
29. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
30. See, e.g., United States. v. Jackson, No. IP 03-79-CR-1 HIF, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15676, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2004).
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of the holdings in relation to dog sniffs in various public and quasi-
public locations. Part two addresses the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Kyllo and privacy rights in the home. Part three argues that, in
considering the holdings and privacy rights in Place, Jacobsen, Cabal-
les, and Kyllo together, the home is afforded the highest level of protec-
tion consisting of the greatest expectation of privacy. Thus, the Court
should find that a dog sniff of a home is a search requiring the govern-
ment to have probable cause before any dogs go sniffing around.
I. UNITED STATES V. PLACE
In United States v. Place, government officials observed Raymond
J. Place's suspicious behavior while waiting in line at the Miami Interna-
tional Airport." The officials obtained Place's identification and
received consent to search his two suitcases.3 2 However, the officers
decided not to search his luggage due to the fact that the plane was about
to depart." Based on discrepancies the officers observed in Place's lug-
gage address tags, they notified authorities in New York where Place's
plane was landing.3 4
When Place landed in La Guardia Airport in New York he was
approached by DEA agents who informed him that they believed he was
carrying narcotics." Place refused consent to search his luggage at
which time the agents took his luggage to Kennedy Airport where a drug
detection dog sniffed the luggage and alerted to the presence of contra-
band.3 6 Agents then obtained a search warrant and discovered cocaine.3 7
Place filed a motion to suppress the cocaine arguing that it was
discovered pursuant to an illegal seizure.38 The contents of the motion
did not specifically address the issue of whether the dog sniff was an
illegal search per se.39 The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and found that, under the circumstances of the case, the seizure was
illegal due in part to the fact that ninety minutes had elapsed from the
time police seized Place's luggage.4 0 However, without the issue
presented being whether a dog sniff constitutes a search, and without




35. Id. at 698-99.
36. Id. at 699. ("The dog reacted positively to the smaller of the two bags . . .
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("In the District Court, respondent did 'not contest the
validity of sniff searches per se . . . .' (quoting United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1228
(E.D.N.Y 1980)).
40. Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10 (majority opinion) ("The length of the detention of
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citing any legal authority, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
found the use of the drug detection dog did not constitute a search.4 '
Justice O'Connor reasoned that a dog sniff is not a search because the
"the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics" and "does
not expose noncontraband items."42 Justice O'Connor specifically
wrote:
A "canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however,
does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontra-
band items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as
does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the contents of
the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained
through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typi-
cal search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence
of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff
tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the
information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures
that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment
and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive
investigative methods.43
Justices Brennan and Blackmun wrote opinions concurring only in
the judgment that the seizure was illegal and foreshadowed the problems
that would arise by the Court issuing a ruling on the dog sniff.4 4 "The
Court of Appeals did not reach or discuss the issue. It was not briefed or
argued in this Court. In short, I agree with Justice Blackmun that the
Court should not address the issue."4 5 Justice Brennan also agreed "the
issue is more complex than the Court's discussion would lead one to
believe."4 6
Justice Blackmun also made clear his distaste for such a swift
holding without truly understanding the ramifications. "My concern
with the Court's opinion has to do . .. with the Court's haste to resolve
the dog-sniff issue."4 7 "Neither party has had an opportunity to brief
the issue, and the Court grasps for the appropriate analysis of the prob-
lem . . . . The Court is certainly in no position to consider all the ramifi-
cations of this important issue."4 8
respondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the
absence of probable cause.").
41. Id. at 707.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 719-20 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 720-21 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 723-24.
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It seems that Justices Brennan and Blackmun were correct in their
concerns of the Court's holding in Place. Despite the fact that Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Place was dicta and did not declare all dog sniffs
constitutional, a majority of courts have determined that under Place, no
matter the location, a dog sniff is not a search. For example, the Ninth
Circuit has stated that "[w]hether or not the statement in Place was a
holding or dictum, the Supreme Court has clearly directed the lower
courts to follow its pronouncement."49 As will be discussed later, it
seems courts have followed that pronouncement in numerous settings-
perhaps a little too literally.
Despite Justice Brennan's and Blackmun's concerns, Place paved
the way for the debate regarding dog sniffs. However, Place only estab-
lished that a dog sniff was not a search when conducted in a public
setting. The Court in no way implied that its analysis applied in the
context of the home. Place was careful to limit its holding to the particu-
lar facts of that case, in that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is
not a search."o This may be the case because the privacy interest a per-
son has in luggage in an airport does not compare to the privacy interest
a person has in the home." Unfortunately, it seems as though courts
have taken Place's holding in a vacuum in determining that dog sniffs
are not searches. Regardless, the Supreme Court did not stop at Place in
determining when and where a person has an expectation of privacy.
A. United States v. Jacobsen
The following year the Court decided United States v. Jacobsen,
which proved to be a partner to Place in the dog sniff arena. While
Jacobsen did not involve a dog sniffing for contraband, it did pave the
way for the Court's position on a person's expectation of privacy in
contraband. When Federal Express employees were examining a dam-
aged package, they noticed a white substance in a plastic bag, inside a
tube.5 2 They notified DEA agents who saw that the package had been
damaged." The agents removed the white powder to conduct a field test
and determined the substance was cocaine." The defendants were then
49. United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding narcotics detection
dog sniff of defendant's luggage in the checked baggage area at the airport was not a search).
50. 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH & SEIZURE § 9.18 (3d ed. 2000).
51. Id.
52. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, Ill (1984).
53. Id.
54. Id. at l 11-12. "As the test is described in the evidence, it involved the use of three test
tubes. When a substance containing cocaine is placed in one test tube after another, it will cause
liquids to take on a certain sequence of colors. Such a test discloses whether or not the substance
is cocaine, but there is no evidence that it would identify any other substances." Id. at 112 n.1.
10372012]
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arrested. 5
In granting certiorari, it seems the Supreme Court wanted to send a
message regarding its position on the new hot topic of the War on
Drugs, which was a recent development at the time. 5 6 In finding that no
search occurred, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held:
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular
substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy. This conclusion is not dependent on the result of any particu-
lar test. It is probably safe to assume that virtually all of the tests
conducted under circumstances comparable to those disclosed by this
record would result in a positive finding; in such cases, no legitimate
interest has been compromised. But even if the results are negative-
merely disclosing that the substance is something other than
cocaine-such a result reveals nothing of special interest. Congress
has decided-and there is no question about its power to do so-to
treat the interest in "privately" possessing cocaine as illegitimate;
thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is
cocaine, and no other arguably "private" fact, compromises no legiti-
mate privacy interest."
Justice Stevens noted that the decision was premised on Place's
holding and referred to the fact that dog sniffs are only able to disclose
the presence or absence of contraband, like the field test conducted in
Jacobsen." It became eerily apparent in Jacobsen that the Court was
taking a different approach when analyzing a person's expectation of
privacy. As Justice Brennan wrote in the dissenting opinion:
In sum, until today this Court has always looked to the manner
in which an individual has attempted to preserve the private nature of
a particular fact before determining whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy upon which the government may not intrude
without substantial justification. And it has always upheld the general
conclusion that searches constitute at least "those more extensive
intrusions that significantly jeopardize the sense of security which is
the paramount concern of Fourth Amendment liberties." United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, adopting the suggestion in Place, the Court has veered
away from this sound and well-settled approach and has focused
instead solely on the product of the would-be search. In so doing, the
55. Id. at 112.
56. Id. at 112-13. ("[B]ecause field tests play an important role in the enforcement of the
narcotics laws, we granted certiorari.") (internal citation omitted).
57. Id. at 123.
58. Id. at 124 ("Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the kind disclosed by
the record will actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to
characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
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Court has ignored the fundamental principle that "[a] search prose-
cuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it
brings to light." Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927)."
After the Court decided Place and Jacobsen, it seemed obvious,
based on the Court's new "end justifying the means" approach, how the
Court would decide the next case involving dog sniffs, contraband, and a
person's expectation of privacy. However, of utmost importance, the
next dog sniff case the Court addressed did not involve the home.
B. Illinois v. Caballes
In Illinois v. Caballes, the Court next addressed the issue of
whether police could conduct a sniff test by a drug detection dog during
the course of a lawful traffic stop.60 Roy Caballes was stopped for
speeding and, while the officer was writing a citation, another officer
arrived with a drug detection dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle.6 1
The dog alerted at the trunk at which point the officers searched the
trunk and discovered marijuana.6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, quoted Jacobsen stating that
"[o]fficial conduct that does not 'compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy' is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment."" The Court
reasoned that because "any interest in possessing contraband cannot be
deemed 'legitimate,' . . . governmental conduct that only reveals the
possession of contraband 'compromises no legitimate privacy
interest.' ""
It is important to note, however, that central to Caballes was the
fact that the motorist was driving on a public road and was lawfully
stopped. As Justice Stevens wrote, "A dog sniff conducted during a con-
cededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the
location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does
not violate the Fourth Amendment."6 5
Caballes and Place are the only two Supreme Court decisions that
have addressed the Fourth Amendment implications of dog sniffs, and
by no means did either decision determine whether a dog sniff at a pri-
vate home is a search. The decisions only involved dog sniffs in public
places. While the Court has clearly shown in Place, Jacobsen, and
Caballes that a person possesses a diminished expectation of privacy in
59. Id. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
61. Id. at 406.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 408 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123).
64. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123).
65. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
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a public setting and has no expectation of privacy with regard to contra-
band, these situations and privacy rights are completely distinguishable
from the privacy afforded to a person and the home. It seems, however,
that anything outside the home, in most courts' views, is fair game.
C. Dog Sniffs in Public Places
Since the Court decided Place, and especially Caballes, many fed-
eral and state courts have found that a dog sniff in a public place is not a
search.6 6 Additionally, courts justify this by finding that a person does
not have an expectation of privacy in the odors that emanate from an
enclosed space because such odors are accessible to the public. 67 For
example, as one court noted: "A person does not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from his or her belongings
in a public place, so the use of a well-trained and reliable narcotics dog
in a public place is generally not a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes."6 8
While it is clear that a person has a lessened expectation of privacy
when the setting occurs in an ordinary public place, this is especially
true in the automobile context. As the Supreme Court has stated:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or
as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for
escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both
its occupants and its contents are in plain view.69
For example, in United States v. Jeffus, a case determined before,
and strikingly similar to, Caballes, Edward Jeffus was lawfully stopped
while driving his vehicle. 0 During the encounter, the police officer grew
suspicious of Jeffus' nervous behavior." After Jeffus refused to consent
to a search of his vehicle, the officer took a drug-detector dog and had
the dog sniff the exterior of Jeffus' vehicle.7 2 After the dog alerted to the
66. See, e.g., United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Olivera-
Mendez, 484 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 2007); People v. Esparza, 272 P.3d 367 (Colo. 2012); Wright v.
Commonwealth, 663 S.E.2d 108 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
67. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 711 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that where
the odor of narcotics exists in a common hallway and is detectable through a human being's sense
of smell, a dog sniff is proper).
68. State v. Cleave, 33 P.3d 633, 636 (N.M. 2001) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 707 (1983); United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 1990); State v.
Villanueva, 796 P.2d 252, 255 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990)).
69. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
70. United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 556 (4th Cir. 1994) (The vehicle Jeffus was traveling
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presence of contraband, the officer searched the vehicle and discovered
cocaine, a firearm, and drug paraphernalia." In affirming the denial of
Jeffus' motion to suppress, the Fourth Circuit relied on Place's holding
and held that "[h]aving the trained dog sniff the perimeter of Jeffus'
vehicle, which had been lawfully stopped in a public place, did not of
itself constitute a search."74
Likewise, in Merrett v. Moore, the Eleventh Circuit held that a dog
sniff of the exterior of a car during a license check did not constitute a
search." In so holding, the court stated:
Here, the dogs sniffed the exterior of the plaintiffs' vehicles; they did
not invade plaintiffs' homes or their bodily integrity. The sniffs
occurred while plaintiffs were lawfully stopped in a public place; and
because the sniffs occurred during the license check, plaintiffs were
not delayed to conduct the sniffs. The sniffs also alerted the officers
only to the potential presence of drugs; they did not expose the con-
tents of plaintiffs' vehicles to public view.
The Eleventh Circuit interestingly noted that the setting in the
case was not a home, implying perhaps that had the location of the
dog sniff been outside the home, the result would be different. Regard-
less, most courts have ruled similarly, finding in the public setting,
a person's expectation of privacy is not the same as the home. Accord-
ingly, courts have found a dog sniff not to be a search when of a
77 80
car, a car at a border patrol checkpoint," a truck, luggage,so
73. Id.
74. Id. at 557 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
75. See Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1553 (11th Cir. 1995).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. United States v. Franklin, 547 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Farrior, 535
F.3d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 2008); State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623, 627-28, (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) ("The dog
sniff alone cannot have been an unreasonable search because a dog sniff is not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes when, as here, it is conducted on the exterior of a car in a public place at
which the police have a right to be present.") (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32
(2000)); Cole v. State, 562 S.E.2d 720, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Washington, 687 So. 2d
575, 580 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
78. United States v. Hernandez, 976 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no search occurred
when border patrol agents conducted dog sniff test of a vehicle at a border patrol checkpoint)
(citing United States v. Gonzalez-Basulto, 898 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Dovali-Avila, 895 F.2d 206, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1990)).
79. State v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); State v. LaFlamme, 869
S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 766-67 (Tenn. 2000).
80. United States v. Williams, 365 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Carter, 859
F. Supp. 202, 204 (E.D. Va. 1994); People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 991 (Colo. 2001) ("The
Supreme Court, moreover, has explicitly held that under the United States Constitution subjecting
luggage to dog sniffs does not constitute a search or seizure.") (citing United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983)); Scott v. State, 927 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
2012] 1041
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
packages,"' a storage unit,8 2 or even a school locker."
The dog sniffs in these cases, however, all occured in a public
place. These cases do not address a person's expectation of privacy in
their home where privacy rights are at their greatest. When people travel
in their cars on public roadways, they encounter curious passersby that
may look inside the car. When stopped at a traffic light, individuals are
surrounded by others who may be observing what is around them. Even
when in a parking lot, pedestrians constantly walk by vehicles, glance in,
and are able to observe the belongings inside.
A person's luggage is also constantly within the public view and is
often given to other people for handling. In the typical situation of
checking into a hotel, a person hands their bags to the hotel staff for
assistance to their room. When a person is on a bus, usually their bags
are checked either underneath or in a compartment above. If taking a
taxi to or from an airport, the driver will customarily put the passenger's
luggage in the trunk.
Especially in today's society, in an airport a person arguably has
the most severely diminished expectation of privacy. Ever since 9/11,
people's expectations of privacy in airports seem to dwindle by the hour
while government security increases by the second. People are repeat-
edly subjected to random scans and questioning. A person knows and
expects to relinquish their belongings at some point. Whether checking
the bags to store underneath the plane, or having them put under an x-
ray machine, a government official is always viewing a person's
belongings.
Without doubt any protection of luggage in such a public location has
been eroded to nearly the point of non-existence in a post-9/11 world.
The individual's expectation of privacy could not be more minimal in
today's airports with their luggage screenings, passenger scans, and
patdown searches.84
While a person has an expectation of privacy in these situations,
however minimal, a person expects public viewing and exposure of their
belongings to some extent. Accordingly, the expectation of privacy in a
public setting, or lack thereof, does not compare to the expectation of
privacy in the home. But what about locations that fall within the middle
of the spectrum of complete public exposure and the privacy in the
81. State v. Kesler, 396 N.W.2d 729, 735 (N.D. 1986).
82. State v. Washburn, 685 S.E.2d 555, 558 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); Commonwealth v.
Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 78 (Pa. 1987).
83. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 1982).
84. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 2006).
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home? Most courts have still sided with Place and found that a dog sniff
is not a search.
D. Quasi-Public Settings
Many courts are making their way to the front door of a person's
home and have addressed dog sniffs in locations that can be classified as
quasi-public or semi-private settings. Courts have found that in situa-
tions where there is public access to some extent, a person has a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy, coupled with no expectation of privacy in
contraband. Accordingly, they find no search occurs when police con-
duct a dog sniff. This has occurred when a dog sniffs a garage from a
public alley," or when a dog sniffs a yard that is in plain view of the
public." Courts have repeatedly found that, when subjected to a dog
sniff, areas outside the home do not carry the same protections as the
inside of a home.
For example, in United States v. Roby, the Eighth Circuit addressed
a dog sniff in the hallway of a hotel." When the dog alerted to the
presence of contraband outside one of the rooms, police obtained a
search warrant and found ten kilograms of cocaine inside Roby's hotel
room." On appeal, the Eighth Circuit addressed Roby's expectation of
privacy inside a hotel and stated:
Mr. Roby had an expectation of privacy in his Hampton Inn hotel
room. But because the corridor outside that room is traversed by
many people, his reasonable privacy expectation does not extend so
far. Neither those who stroll the corridor nor a sniff dog needs a war-
rant for such a trip. As a result, we hold that a trained dog's detection
of odor in a common corridor does not contravene the Fourth
Amendment.89
Additionally, in Fitzgerald v. State, a Maryland court addressed
whether a dog sniff of an apartment while conducted at the common
hallway of an apartment building is a search.90 Fitzgerald moved to sup-
press the marijuana and the circuit court denied the motion. The circuit
court found that "the apartment hallway was open to the public" and no
85. United States v. Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235, 238 (7th Cir. 1990) (relying on Place and
Jacobsen).
86. United States v. Hayes, 551 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding dog sniff did not violate
defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy because the contents of the bag that the dog smelled
were not located inside defendant's home and because the sanctuary of the home did not extend to
the front yard where the sniff occurred).
87. United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1124 (8th Cir. 1997).
88. Id. at 1122-23.
89. Id. at 1125.
90. Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1007 (Md. 2004).
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search occurred." On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed to
which the Maryland Supreme Court granted certiorari.9 2 The Maryland
Supreme Court found "the apartment building's common area and hall-
ways were accessible to the public" and thus, the dog sniff was not a
search.93
Additionally, in Stabler v. State, a Florida appellate court also
addressed the issue of a dog sniff outside a person's apartment. 94 Sta-
bler's apartment had a common area and his front door was open to
public access. 95 Police officers brought a drug dog to the front door of
the apartment, where it alerted to the presence of contraband.9 6 A search
was conducted, during which the police discovered cocaine.97
The Florida First District Court of Appeal, relying heavily on Place
and Caballes, contended that:
Neither Caballes nor Place turned on the location of the dog sniff but
rather on the target of the dog sniff and the unique nature of a dog's
nose: "a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog [is]
'sui generis' because it 'discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item.'""8
The court, agreeing with Place, Jacobsen, and Caballes, found that the
dog sniff did not constitute a search and that one does not have an
expectation of privacy in contraband. 99 It further concluded that "the dog
sniff at the front door of the apartment did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search because it did not violate a legitimate privacy inter-
est."100 Interestingly, the court seemed to contradict itself by first claim-
ing that Place and Caballes did not focus on the location of the dog
sniff, and then writing that "[p]aramount to [its] conclusion is the fact
that the dog was located on a common walkway within the apartment
complex when the sniff occurred." 01
These conclusions are troubling for several reasons. It appears that
courts are taking the holdings of Place, Jacobsen, and Caballes in a
91. Id. at 1008.
92. Id. at 1009.
93. Id. at 1017.
94. Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
95. Id. at 1259.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1261 (alteration in original) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S 405, 409 (2005))
(quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
99. Stabler, 990 So. 2d at 1263.
100. Id.
101. Id. See also State v. Davis, 711 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) ("'[C]ommon
hallways . . . [are] available for the use of residents and their guests, the landlord and his agents,
and others having legitimate reasons to be on the premises.'") (alterations in original) (quoting
United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977)).
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vacuum and are not focusing on the protections afforded to a home
under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, courts are focusing on the fact
that there is contraband and will look to any scenario where there may
be public access for the end to justify the means. However, as Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, stated in Kyllo with regard to the home,
"all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from
prying government eyes."l 0 2
By narrowly focusing on a location where there may be some form
of public access, like in Fitzgerald and Stabler, courts run the risk of
defining Fourth Amendment rights through economic class."o' Why
should one person who can afford a house be more protected than a
person with less means that can only afford to rent an apartment? If
courts continue to find that no search occurs when in the context of an
apartment building, but perhaps a search does occur when at a person's
private home, then people who are more financially successful would
have greater Fourth Amendment protections than others who are not.
Nowhere in the text of the Fourth Amendment does it state that property
owners are secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. It shows
that all people are protected from unwarranted government intrusion.
Affording greater protections to those with more wealth is certainly not
the intention of the Fourth Amendment. Courts need to focus on the
privacy afforded inside the home when analyzing dog sniffs. In doing
so, the privacy rights of individuals will remain consistent, regardless of
whether a person's home is "'situated by itself on a spacious multi-acre
estate or stacked upon others in a . . . crowded tenement in the inner
city."'"l 4 Otherwise, the Fourth Amendment will be rendered meaning-
less. It is undeniable that the home, regardless of the situation, affords
the greatest protection because the home is the one place a person has
the greatest expectation of privacy. It is the place a person retreats from
the world and it is the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment. 05
II. KYLLO AND THE HOME
Kyllo v. United States is turning out to be the defender and guardian
against dog sniffs at the home. Although Kyllo did not involve police
using a dog to conduct a sniff test, it did highlight the magnitude of a
person's expectation of privacy inside the home.
102. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
103. People v. Jones, 125 Misc. 2d 91, 93-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (argument by counsel that
passengers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in vehicle and stating, "Fourth Amendment
rights should not depend on one's economic status.").
104. Cowles v. State, 23 P.3d 1168, 1180 (Alaska 2001) (Fabe, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith
v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 805 (Alaska 1973) (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting)).
105. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
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In Kyllo, government agents suspected Danny Kyllo of growing
marijuana in his home.10 6 When marijuana is grown in a home, typically
a person will use high-intensity lamps that emit high amounts of heat.'0o
As such, government agents sitting in a parked car across the street used
a thermal imager scan on Kyllo's home to detect infrared radiation. 0 8
The imaging device showed that the roof over Kyllo's garage and one
side wall were hotter than normal.'09 Based on the reading, the agents
determined that Kyllo was growing marijuana inside his house."i0 The
agents obtained a search warrant and found over a hundred marijuana
plants growing inside Kyllo's home."'
Kyllo filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized which was
denied." 2 After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to
determine the intrusiveness of thermal imaging devices, the district court
found that the device did not show any images of people or activities
occurring within the home and the device could not penetrate any walls
or windows to observe conversations or activities."' Ultimately, the dis-
trict court found that the device did not reveal any of the home's "inti-
mate details."" 4 The Court of Appeals affirmed.' '"
The Supreme Court was faced with the challenge of determining
whether a search of Kyllo's home occured. Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia conceded that "the antecedent question whether or not a Fourth
Amendment 'search' has occurred is not so simple under our prece-
dent."" 6 In finding that a search occurred, the majority rejected the
notion of a distinction between "off-the-wall" observations and
"through-the-wall" surveillance, which Justice Stevens advocated for in
his dissent."' Instead, as Justice Scalia wrote, "[i]n the home, our cases
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 29-30 ("Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit
but which is not visible to the naked eye. The imager converts radiation into images based on
relative warmth-black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; in that
respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.").
109. Id. at 30.
110. Id. (In addition to the thermal imaging, the agents also based their conclusions on tips





115. Id. at 30-31.
116. Id. at 31.
117. Id. at 35 ("But just as a thermal imager captures only heat emanating from a house, so
also a powerful directional microphone picks up only sound emanating from a house-and a
satellite capable of scanning from many miles away would pick up only visible light emanating
from a house. We rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz,
1046 [ Vol. 66: 103 1
KEEP YOUR NOSE OUT OF MY BUSINESS
from prying government eyes.""' What seemed to be of particular
importance was the thermal imaging device's inability to differentiate
between intimate details or non-intimate details.1 1 9 Justice Scalia noted
that the device could not differentiate between the intimate details of a
woman taking a nightly bath or the simple fact that someone left a light
on inside the home. 1 2 0 This point, as discussed later, directly addresses a
dog's inability to differentiate between legal and illegal contraband, inti-
mate and non-intimate details.
The Court looked to its precedent and found heat emanating from
the home, just like specific items, such as a can of ether1 21 and the regis-
tration number to a phonograph turntable,12 2 is an intimate detail. 123 The
Court recognized that:
We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws "a firm line at the
entrance to the house." That line, we think, must be not only firm but
also bright-which requires clear specification of those methods of
surveillance that require a warrant. While it is certainly possible to
conclude from the videotape of the thermal imaging that occurred in
this case that no "significant" compromise of the homeowner's pri-
vacy has occurred, we must take the long view, from the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.
The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what
was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted,
and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the
interests and rights of individual citizens. 124
While Justice Scalia failed to analyze the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment in Kyllo, this principle is consistent with his earlier
opinion in Wyoming v. Houghton, where he stated that a historical
inquiry is the starting point for searches and seizures. 12 5 It seems as
though the Court, as evidenced by Place, Jacobsen, and Caballes, forgot
where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the
phone booth.").
118. Id. at 37.
119. Id. at 38 ("Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to 'intimate details' would not
only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in application, failing to provide 'a workable
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment.'") (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)).
120. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
121. Id. at 37-38 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
122. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)).
123. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
124. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
125. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (determining probable cause
existed to conduct a search of an automobile under the Fourth Amendment and stating, "[i]n
determining whether a particular governmental action violates this provision, we inquire first
whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the
Amendment was framed.").
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that principle somewhere along the way. While Place and Caballes
involved dog sniffs in a public setting, the privacy protections and his-
tory of the home were not thought of or analyzed. Accordingly, if the
Court is going to address dog sniffs in the home, it must first start by
analyzing the history and privacy afforded to the home.
As early as 1604, an English court stated that "the house of every
one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against
injury and violence, as for his repose . ... William Blackstone later
wrote, "the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the
immunity of a man's house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never
suffer it to be violated with impunity . . . ."'27 The primary reason the
Fourth Amendment was enacted was due to British troops conducting
searches and seizures of homes that people sought to eliminate for-
ever.'2 8 "The driving force behind the adoption of the Amendment ...
was widespread hostility among the former colonists to the issuance of
writs of assistance . . . and general search warrants . . . ."129 Those writs
gave officers complete power and discretion to conduct searches of
places. 3 o "'Opposition to the search policies centered upon the use by
British customs house officers of the writs of assistance, general war-
rants which allowed officers of the crown to search, at their will, wher-
ever they suspected untaxed goods to be.' "''
[T]he writ of assistance was 'the worst instrument of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental
principles of the constitution, that ever was found in an English
lawbook .... It is a power that places the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer.' 3 2
As English government searches increased and became frequent
after 1485, English thought began to postulate that certain types of house
searches by government agents were unreasonable and unlawful. "[T]he
colonists' memory of the use and abuse of the writs was one of the
reasons for the adoption, by several colonies, of constitutional safe-
126. Semayne's Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.) 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 b (footnote
omitted).
127. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223.
128. See generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Leonard W. Levy ed., De Capo Press 1970)
(1937).
129. United States v. verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (citing Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886)).
130. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.
131. Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Mass. 1987) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Cundriff, 415 N.E.2d 172 (Mass. 1980)).
132. Blood, 507 N.E.2d at 1035 (quotations omitted).
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guards regulating searches.""' In fact, the framers focused "almost
exclusively about the need to ban house searches under general
warrants."l 34
Due to these historical concerns, courts have afforded the home the
greatest protection. Courts focus on the special nature of homes and give
homes additional protection as compared to things observed in public.
For example, as Justice Douglas noted in Lombard v. Louisiana, "[t]he
principle that a man's home is his castle is basic to our system of juris-
prudence." 3 5 Almost all courts will agree that "[n]owhere are expecta-
tions of privacy greater than in the home." 3 6
"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."'"3 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment draws
"a firm line at the entrance to the house."' Based on this principle, "the
'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording
of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' "139
In this context, courts have afforded the home the greatest protec-
tion. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a search of a home,
generally, can only be done with a warrant. 40 The Court has made it
"clear that any physical invasion of the structure of the home, 'by even a
fraction of an inch,' was too much . . . ."" Conversely, searches of
other types of property, such as cars and even people, often may be
conducted without warrants.' 4 2 Similarly, government officials must
secure a warrant, absent exigent circumstances, before arresting a person
in the home, while no warrant is required to arrest a person in public. 143
Therefore, it is clear that the expectation of privacy people have in
their homes is unquestionably greater than the expectation of privacy a
person has in a public setting, like an automobile or luggage at an air-
133. Id. (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).
134. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547,
551 (1999).
135. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 275 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
136. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 820 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
138. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
139. Id. at 585 (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
140. Kyllo v. United States, 533 US. 27, 31 (2001) ("With few exceptions, the question
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered
no."); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (holding that searches of homes by the
federal government require warrants).
141. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).
142. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991) (holding no warrant required
when police possessed probable cause to search vehicle).
143. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (no warrant requirement for arrest
made on street).
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port. Luggage and the automobile cannot find its roots in the past five
hundred years of history. Luggage and automobiles are not a person's
castle. Neither were luggage, nor automobiles the focal points in drafting
the Fourth Amendment.
III. BRINGING PLACE, CABALLES, AND KYLLo TOGETHER
So, what happens when Place, Jacobsen, Caballes, and Kyllo come
together at the home? Will the Court apply the analysis in Kyllo or will
it follow the precedent set by Place, Jacobsen, and Caballes? The
Supreme Court had the opportunity to finalize the issue in State v.
Rabb,'" a case decided before the Court's holding in Caballes. Instead
of hearing arguments, the Court, after deciding Caballes, passed on the
issue and remanded the case back to the Florida District Court of Appeal
to readdress the issue in light of the Court's recent holding in
Caballes.'45
A. Florida v. Rabb
In State v. Rabb, an anonymous tipster informed the police that
James Rabb was growing marijuana in his home.14 6 After conducting
surveillance, the police observed Rabb leave his house in his car and
followed him.'4 7 When Rabb committed a traffic infraction, officers
stopped his vehicle.' 48 During the seizure, the officers observed books
and videos in Rabb's car detailing how to cultivate marijuana. 4 9
The police brought a drug detection dog to sniff the exterior of
Rabb's vehicle and, after the dog's positive alert, the police found a
cannabis cigarette inside the vehicle.' The police took the dog to
Rabb's residence where they approached the front door and had the dog
conduct a sniff test that alerted to the presence of contraband inside.'
The police obtained a warrant to search the home and found numerous
marijuana plants growing inside the residence along with other contra-
band that was present.' 52
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Florida appellate court did
not change its opinion or analysis, and rightfully so. The court's analysis
144. 881 So. 2d 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, 544 U.S. 1028 (2005).
145. Florida v. Rabb, 544 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2005).




150. Id. at 1179.
151. Id. ("The drug detector dog walked from the public roadway in front of the residence, up
to the front door and alerted.").
152. Id.
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centered on the privacy rights of the home and found that "[g]iven the
shroud of protection wrapped around a house by the Fourth Amend-
ment," Kyllo was the appropriate case to control the issue. 5
The Florida court agreed that the Supreme Court's holding in Place
demonstrated that a dog sniff in a public place was not a search.' 5 4 How-
ever, the court differentiated between a person's expectation of privacy
in luggage in an airport and a person's expectation of privacy in the
home.15 5 Quoting the Second Circuit in United States v. Thomas, the
court found that "'a practice that is not intrusive in a public airport may
be intrusive when employed at a person's home.' "156 The court went on
to compare the thermal imaging device in Kyllo to that of a dog sniff
and found that "[t]he use of the dog, like the use of a thermal imager,
allowed law enforcement to use sense-enhancing technology to intrude
into the constitutionally-protected area of Rabb's house, which is rea-
sonably considered a search violative of Rabb's expectation of privacy
in his retreat." 5 7
The court rejected the notion that a dog sniff provides limited infor-
mation regarding only the presence or absence of contraband."' Follow-
ing Kyllo's precedent, the court noted that the quality or quantity of
information obtained through the search is not the main concern.15 9
Instead, the court focused on the fact that the police attempted to obtain
information from inside the house, or in the context of a dog sniff, the
sniff crossed the "firm line" of the protection afforded under the Fourth
Amendment inside a person's home.' Regardless of the fact that the
dog only detects odors, the court noted that the smell coming from
inside the house was an intimate detail, just like the temperature inside
Kyllo's home.' 6 '
B. United States v. Jackson
On point with Rabb, in United States v. Jackson, an Indiana federal
153. Id. at 1182.
154. Id. at 1184.
155. Id. at 1184-85.
156. Id. at 1184 (quoting United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir. 1985)).
157. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1184.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. ("[I]t is of no importance that a dog sniff provides limited information regarding only
the presence or absence of contraband, because as in Kyllo, the quality or quantity of information
obtained through the search is not the feared injury. Rather, it is the fact that law enforcement
endeavored to obtain the information from inside the house at all, or in this case, the fact that a
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district court found a dog sniff of the exterior of the home was a search
by comparing dog sniffs to Kyllo's thermal imaging devices.16 2 In find-
ing no distinction between the two, the court noted:
Dogs with such training are not in "general public use" (which refers
to the general public, not to police forces, which often use such dogs
to detect drugs). The information such a dog can provide about the
interior of the home would not otherwise be obtained without a phys-
ical intrusion into the home. The court sees no constitutional distinc-
tion between the use of specially trained dogs and sophisticated
electronics from outside a home to detect activities in or contents of
the home's interior.16 3
The court then differentiated between dog sniffs in public places
versus those that occur in the setting of a private home. The court found
that privacy rights in a public place are severely diminished, however:
The same is not true of a home .... The privacy interest a person
maintains in a home is more substantial than the privacy interest in
personal luggage while traveling on public carriers or in an automo-
bile. And in Place, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the snif-
fed luggage was located in a public place. There is nothing about the
back door to a private residence that qualifies as a similarly "public
place," even though the police officers themselves had a right to
stand at the door, to knock, and to talk with anyone who came to the
door.164
C. United States v. Thomas
The Second Circuit addressed the same issue, which was heard
after Place but before the Supreme Court's guidance in Kyllo. In United
States v. Thomas, police officers used a dog to conduct a sniff outside
the front door of one of the defendant's apartments.165 After the dog
alerted to the presence of contraband, a search warrant was executed and
the police discovered narcotics inside the apartment.166 Recognizing the
Supreme Court's holding in Place, the Second Circuit noted:
It is one thing to say that a sniff in an airport is not a search, but quite
another to say that a sniff can never be a search. The question always
to be asked is whether the use of a trained dog intrudes on a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy.167
162. United States v. Jackson, No. IP 03-79-CR-I HIF, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15676, at *10
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2004).
163. Id.
164. Id. at *12-*13 (internal citation omitted).
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In finding that the home is a completely different setting than a
public place, such as an airport, the court wrote:
Thus, a practice that is not intrusive in a public airport may be intru-
sive when employed at a person's home. Although using a dog sniff
for narcotics may be discriminating and unoffensive relative to other
detection methods, and will disclose only the presence or absence of
narcotics, it remains a way of detecting the contents of a private,
enclosed space. With a trained dog police may obtain information
about what is inside a dwelling that they could not derive from the
use of their own senses. Consequently, the officers' use of a dog is
not a mere improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary eye-
glasses improve vision, but is a significant enhancement accom-
plished by a different, and far superior, sensory instrument. Here the
defendant had a legitimate expectation that the contents of his closed
apartment would remain private, that they could not be "sensed" from
outside his door. Use of the trained dog impermissibly intruded on
that legitimate expectation. The Supreme Court in Place found only
"that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to
pursue here-exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located
in a public place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Because of defendant
Wheelings' heightened expectation of privacy inside his dwelling, the
canine sniff at his door constituted a search.168
While some courts have criticized Thomas's holding,'6 1 the Second
Circuit very recently affirmed its Thomas holding in United States v.
Hayes, which was decided after Caballes and Kyllo.I7 o The Hayes court
noted:
Consistent with the strong expectation of privacy in the sanctity of
one's home, however, this Court has held that a canine sniff at the
door of an apartment-even if the only function of the sniff is to
reveal illegal narcotics inside that apartment-is nonetheless a
"search" subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. As we
explained in Thomas, with regard to a canine sniff at the door to an
apartment that revealed narcotics inside the apartment, "the defendant
had a legitimate expectation that the contents of his closed apartment
would remain private."' 7 '
It is clear from Rabb, Jackson, and Thomas that the courts differen-
tiate a private home from a public place in determining whether a search
168. Id. at 1366-67 (internal citations omitted).
169. United States v. Hogan, 122 F. Supp. 2d 358, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Thomas appears
never to have been followed by any court outside the Circuit and has been criticized by several
other circuit courts.").
170. United States v. Hayes, 551 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a dog sniff of a
black bag left inside a bush did not constitute a search).
171. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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has occurred. Those courts "view the reasonable expectation of privacy
afforded to locations along a hierarchy from public to private. An airport
and a highway are unquestionably public places with little or no privacy,
as much as a home is undoubtedly a private place characterized by its
very privacy."1 7 2
Accordingly, in Jardines, the Supreme Court needs to focus its
analysis on the fact that the dog sniff occurred at a home, rather than a
public setting, and not on the fact that the end result may or may not be
contraband. Place and Caballes do not address the constitutionality of a
dog sniff in a private setting. Instead, Place and Caballes focus on two
situations that occur in public. It is undeniable that a person's expecta-
tion of privacy in an airport or a vehicle is nowhere near the same as a
private home:
A house is not movable or on display to the public (at least as far as
its interior). The interior of the house is not pervasively regulated by
government. If the Fourth Amendment has any meaning at all, a dog
sniff at the exterior of a house should not be permitted to uncloak this
remaining bastion of privacy, this most sacred of places under Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.173
D. This Focus is on the Privacy of the Home, Not the End
Result Being Contraband
While the Supreme Court has stated that there is no expectation of
privacy in contraband, this rationale ignores certain principles and
exceptions. For one, it fails to take into account Kyllo's acknowledgment
that all details in the home are intimate. Just as the majority in Kyllo was
concerned with the thermal imager's inability to differentiate between
intimate and non-intimate details, so too does a dog sniff fail to differen-
tiate between intimate and non-intimate details, along with legal and
non-legal contraband. If a dog only alerts to the presence of contraband,
what about contraband that is lawfully present inside the home? What
about the all too common scenario of prescription medication? While
history shows that dogs sniffs can alert to bombs, illegal contraband, and
even people, it is disingenuous to assume that a the dog sniff differenti-
ates illegal contraband from a written prescription.
Determining if there is contraband inside a home is only ascer-
tained after the dog sniffs the location. This end justifying the means
approach is contrary to the very nature of the Fourth Amendment and is
exactly what Justice Brennan was concerned about in his dissent in
Jacobsen. The focus is not the end result; the focus is what action the
172. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
173. Id. at 1189.
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government is undertaking in conducting a dog sniff. If the Court
focuses on the end result being contraband and does not focus on the
privacy rights afforded to a person in the home, there would be no mea-
sure to hold police accountable for arbitrary action. If police were
allowed to conduct sniffs at a private home and the dog alerts to contra-
band, there would be no preventative measure to stop the police from
invading one's privacy by entering the home, only to find that whatever
"contraband" was inside the home was lawfully prescribed by a doctor.
This is why the Supreme Court's holding in Caballes-that a dog sniff
only alerts to the presence of contraband- fails to consider the lawful
intimate details of the home. The Court's ruling also fails to take into
account that all things inside the home are protected by the Fourth
Amendment and that dogs cannot differentiate between what is lawful
and unlawful.
As one scholar wrote:
The most disturbing aspect of the Caballes opinion, however, is its
application in California and the other states that lawfully permit pos-
session of marijuana for medicinal purposes. Justice Stevens' lapse in
recalling this exception is especially disturbing, since he himself
wrote a sympathetic concurring opinion in Oakland Cannabis Club,
suggesting the Court was not deciding the availability of a medical
necessity defense for patients who possess marijuana for medicinal
purposes, only that the defense was unavailable for distributors.
Obviously, drug sniffing dogs are not trained to distinguish between
marijuana that is possessed by a distributor and marijuana that is pos-
sessed by a patient.174
Furthermore, while a dog sniff discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, this argument fails to take into account the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment-protecting people's privacy in a place, not
quantifying information.
[A] slippery slope portends peril for privacy if the item searched for
is the measuring stick. If determining whether law enforcement con-
duct constitutes a search is solely a function of whether the item
searched for is illegal, whether that item be in a vehicle on a public
highway or beyond the closed doors of an individual's castle, the
Fourth Amendment is rendered meaningless. Nothing would deter
law enforcement from marching a dog up to the doors of every house
on a street hoping the dog sniffs drugs inside. If drugs are detected,
then no search has occurred because there is no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in drugs and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated;
if drugs are not detected, then law enforcement cannot charge the
174. Gerald F. Uelmen, Illinois v. Caballes: Some Disturbing Questions, THE CHAMPION, May
2005, at 38.
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individual with a crime and the unfounded search goes undeterred.
Such an "ends justifies the means" approach to the Fourth Amend-
ment is simply not what the Founders intended when they embodied
a barrier at the door of the home in the Fourth Amendment.' 75
The Jardines court was also concerned with this possible situation
when it noted that "if government agents can conduct a dog 'sniff test' at
a private residence without any prior evidentiary showing of wrongdo-
ing, there is nothing to prevent the agents from applying the procedure
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, or based on whim and fancy, at
the home of any citizen."
Interestingly enough, Justice Brennan originally recognized this
concern twenty-five years ago in his dissent in Jacobsen when he wrote:
In fact, the Court's analysis is so unbounded that if a device were
developed that could detect, from the outside of a building, the pres-
ence of cocaine inside, there would be no constitutional obstacle to
the police cruising through a residential neighborhood and using the
device to identify all homes in which the drug is present. In short,
under the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment first suggested in
Place and first applied in this case, these surveillance techniques
would not constitute searches and therefore could be freely pursued
whenever and wherever law enforcement officers desire. Hence, at
some point in the future, if the Court stands by the theory it has
adopted today, search warrants, probable cause, and even "reasonable
suspicion" may very well become notions of the past.' 77
IV. CONCLUSION
Place, Jacobsen, and Caballes do not address a person's expecta-
tion of privacy in the home. In the home, all details are private and
intimate. Regardless of the results of a dog sniff, the focus needs to be
on the expectation of privacy afforded to the home through history and
the original intent of the Fourth Amendment. It is clear that a person's
expectation of privacy in a public setting is severely diminished. How-
ever, that context is not the same as the home, which affords the highest
protections. If the Court focuses on whether there is contraband, instead
of what is the expectation of privacy in the home, the Fourth Amend-
ment will be eliminated. The government will have free reign to invade
people's lives based on a whim or hunch. The future is unclear; how-
ever, we can only hope that the Constitution remains intact. Until the
Court addresses the issue this year, people in most jurisdictions are at
175. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1190-91.
176. Jardines, v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 36 (Ha. 2011).
177. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the mercy of arbitrary government action that requires no showing of
probable cause. As such, the entire history of the Constitution and
Fourth Amendment is in jeopardy.
